Title: Nash equilibria for a coalitional game on Atlanto-Scandian herring
Authors: Marko Lindroos
Systems Analysis Laboratory
Helsinki University of Technology
P.O. Box 1100, 02015 HUT, FINLAND
Date: April 2000
Status: Systems Analysis Laboratory Research Reports E6 April 2000
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study the coalitional game between the potential fishing nations of Atlanto-Scandian (or Norwegian spring-spawning) herring. We study a three-player cooperative game where we use Shapley value and nucleolus as solution concepts. We show that full cooperation between all fishing nations is not stable in the case of efficient fishing fleets. Further, the potential new members do not have an incentive to join in this case. However, the case of inefficient fleets gives opposite results and is thus a more promising case for cooperation.
Keywords: Atlanto-Scandian herring, cooperative games, international fisheries, new member problem.